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Forest Service Use of Best Value Contracting
a sample from the southwest region
Introduction
about a decade ago, the USDa Forest Service began 
to replace sealed bidding processes that required awards 
to go to the lowest qualified bidder with negotiated 
contracts that permit the agency to consider best value 
to the government when awarding contracts. Best value 
contracting allows the government to take into account 
factors such as past performance, technical capability, 
and experience in addition to price. Under some circum-
stances, the Forest Service may also consider local com-
munity benefit when evaluating offers from contractors. 
However, in policy debates, some contractors, 
workers, and community groups have asserted that the 
Forest Service weighs price most heavily and, conse-
quently, essentially continues to do “low bid” contract-
ing. They feel that low-priced contractors are sometimes 
given contracts with little concern for the quality of 
the work or treatment of workers. others argue that 
the Forest Service considers best value when awarding 
contracts. recently, newspaper articles have focused on 
the working conditions of immigrant, seasonal, guest, 
and undocumented workers performing labor-intensive 
activities such as tree thinning, tree planting, and other 
reforestation activities (knudson 2005). There has also 
been concern that the Forest Service may not be con-
sidering local benefit when evaluating contract offers. 
Finally, some of these same constituents have expressed 
concern that the Forest Service awards contracts well 
below the government estimate of the cost to complete 
the work. although the federal government cannot reject 
an offer simply because of its relationship to the govern-
ment estimate, some are concerned that, when bid prices 
are well below the government estimate, these contracts 
may be awarded at prices below the cost necessary to 
treat workers according to the law (Dietz 2006; U.S. Sen-
ate 2001, 2006). 
Despite this political debate, there is relatively little 
documentation about how the Forest Service evaluates 
its contracts and how that affects contract awards. In 
addition, the relationship of government estimates and 
award prices has not been systematically evaluated. 
These gaps in information exist, in part, because the 
federal government is limited in the kind of information 
it can release about individual bidders and their offers 
when using best value contracting mechanisms. How-
ever, by reporting aggregate information about a sample 
of contracts, we can begin to understand contracting 
patterns without revealing information about specific 
contractors and their offers.
Purpose
The purpose of this project is to gain a better under-
standing about how the Forest Service uses best value 
and government estimates in contract awards. Specifi-
cally, this paper analyzes evaluation criteria and pro-
posal-rating documentation, calculates the frequency of 
awards to the lowest price offer and the highest ranked 
non-price offer, and compares the government estimate 
and award prices. It does this using a random sample of 
forest management contracts. 
Methods
We selected a random sample of 60 contracts from 
fiscal years 2004 through 2006 from five national forests 
in new mexico in Forest Service region 3 using contract 
data from the Federal Procurement Data System. of the 
51 contracts for which we received information, 33% 
were from 2004, 28% from 2005, and 39% from 2006.
all the contracts were for forest and land manage-
ment services, including, but not limited to: thinning, 
tree planting, roadwork, recreation, surveys, studies, and 
environmental analysis. The data exclude all supplies 
contracts, any activities not associated with land man-
agement, and fire suppression. Because this is an evalu-
ation of procurement contracting, it does not include 
timber sales.
our initial sample included 12 disadvantaged busi-
ness set-aside [so-called 8(a) set-aside] contracts or other 
sole-source contracts, which were not awarded on a 
best value basis.  In addition, it included five contracts 
awarded to the lowest cost technically acceptable bid-
der.  The sample included three contracts whose files 
could not be found, likely because they had been placed 
in storage and six contracts that were delivery orders 
against other contracts already in our sample. all of 
these contracts were excluded from further analysis.  
This reduced our sample to 34. 
We asked five national forests to provide the follow-
ing information for each contract:
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• Evaluation criteria and weighting as described in  
  the solicitation
• Price offers of all bidders
• Documentation of contract evaluations and rank- 
  ings of offers
• government estimate
• Documentation of how the government estimate  
  was calculated 
The types and amounts of information provided 
varied from case to case. 
Because this is a relatively small sample compared 
to the overall all procurement of the Forest Service and 
the contracts are from a single state in a single Forest 
Service region, it is important to interpret the findings 
conservatively and avoid broad generalizations. This 
is particularly true because of the diversity of arrange-
ments we found.
Findings
Based on the contract information we received, we 
estimate that the Forest Service awarded between 61% 
and 67% of sample contracts on a best value basis.
our sample of 34 contracts included 18 tree thin-
ning contracts (53%), eight road construction contracts, 
four survey contracts, one recreation maintenance 
contract, one fire rehabilitation contract, and two other 
natural resource conservation services contracts. The 17 
contracts excluded from the study because they were 
not awarded on a best value basis included seven tree 
thinning services contracts, five construction and main-
tenance contracts, four survey/studies, and one other 
natural resource service contract.
of the 34 contracts in the sample, the Forest Service 
solicited 56% using a request for quote (rFQ) and 32% 
using a request for proposal (rFP). For 12%, we could 
not determine whether they were solicited using an rFQ 
or rFP with the information provided; these were typi-
cally commercial items contracts.
requests for proposal and requests for quote 
are two forms of contract solicitations that allow for                
consideration of best value to the government. rFPs 
are typically used for large contracts where formal 
solicitation procedures are appropriate. rFQs are more 
typically used for smaller contracts, typically less than 
$100,000, when more informal solicitation processes are 
appropriate. RFQs are part of the simplified acquisition 
procedures. Commercial items contracts can be used 
when the goods or services being purchased are avail-
able commercially or when they are being purchased 
using a performance-based contract. Commercial items 
contracts can use simplified acquisition procedures up 
to $5 million.
The Forest Service received between one and 10 
offers per solicitation in our sample, with the average 
number of offers being 4.6. The median number of offers 
was 3.5. That is, half of the contracts had four or more 
offers and half had three or fewer bidders.
although tree thinning contracts comprised 53% of 
the sample, they made up 69% of the contracts with five 
or more bids. This suggests that the contract thinning 
market may be slightly more competitive than other 
parts of the market. In addition, five other contracts 
were awarded on the basis of technically acceptable 
lowest quote in our original sample. of those, the two 
that received more than five offers were for tree thinning 
services.
Best Value Evaluation
a central purpose of this paper is examine the fac-
tors that the Forest Service uses to evaluate offers and 
how those criteria are weighted. The evaluation criteria 
provided to bidders in solicitations establishes the stan-
dards for assessing offers. The evaluation factors that the 
Forest Service chooses can create or limit the opportu-
nity for the Forest Service to consider factors other than 
price when they decide whom to award contracts to. 
When non-price evaluation criteria are limited in scope 
and weighted heavily toward price, we might expect 
that the lowest bidder would be more likely to be award-
ed the contract. By contrast, when non-price evaluation 
criteria are extensive and heavily weighted, we might 
expect that factors other than price would play a larger 
role in decision-making. In these cases, we would expect 
that they lowest bidder would not be significantly more 
likely to win than others.
Criteria Provided to Bidders
evaluation Factors
In our sample solicitations, the Forest Service 
included seven major types of evaluation criteria. The 
most common non-price factors were past performance 
(87% of the solicitations), personnel (39%), and techni-
cal skills (39%). Technical approach and experience 
appeared less frequently.
Solicitations combined these factors in a wide vari-
ety of ways. The most common combinations were: 
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• past performance, technical skills, and price (24%  
  of solicitations)
• past performance, technical skills, personnel, and  
  price (18%) 
• past performance, experience, personnel, and   
  price (15%)
In 26% of the cases, the solicitations included these 
general evaluation categories with little additional detail 
about what would constitute a satisfactory answer. In 
38% of the cases, a detailed description of what was 
required was in the evaluation criteria section. In 15% 
of the cases, additional explanation was included else-
where in the solicitation.
none of the solicitations in our sample indicated 
that local benefit would be a factor in evaluation. We 
asked three contracting officers whether they used local 
benefit criteria to see if our sample was representative. 
one said that he/she did sometimes consider local bene-
fit, but was unsure what affect that it had because he/she 
weighted price equal to all factors combined. He/she did 
point out, however, that they had more ability to direct 
micro purchases locally and felt that this occurred fairly 
frequently. (We did not analyze micro purchases.) a sec-
ond contracting officer said that he/she had used local 
benefit criteria once in the early 2000s. A third contract-
ing officer said that he/she had considered local com-
munity benefit in the early 2000s but no longer does so 
in service contracts. However, he/she indicated that they 
do include local benefit criteria in their stewardship 
contracts. The lack of local community benefit criteria 
in our sample contracts combined with discussions with 
contracting officers suggests that the national forests in 
this study rarely consider community benefit in contract 
selection outside of stewardship contracting.
Weighing Criteria in solicitation
Contract solicitations in our sample used three 
main methods for indicating the relative importance of 
various criteria. First, and most commonly, solicitations 
qualitatively listed or described the relative importance 
of price to other factors. Solicitations might say, for 
example, that price is of equal important to past perfor-
mance and technical capability combined. In addition, 
four solicitations (all rFPs) assigned numerical points 
to each factor. Finally, four of the solicitations did not 
provide any information about the relative importance 
of the factors. 
We coded all of the solicitations into groups based 
on the relative importance of price to other factors. of 
the solicitations that listed evaluation criteria, 24 (71%) 
said price would be equal to all other factors combined, 
and four indicated that price would be less important 
than all other factors combined. none indicated that 
price would be greater than all other factors combined. 
However, three of the awards in our sample indicated 
that price was the only factor being evaluated. The 
remaining three awards did not indicate how the criteria 
would be weighted. In addition, five contracts in our 
larger sample were awarded to the lowest priced techni-
cally acceptable proposal.
Evaluation Process
We examined documentation of the evaluation 
processes that the Forest Service used to select awards 
to understand what role non-price factors played in the 
selection of contractors. 
Weighting During evaluation
We sought to understand how the Forest Service 
weighted factors when conducting their evaluation. The 
Forest Service typically used the criteria provided in the 
solicitation. In the four cases with numerical weighting 
in the solicitation, this simply meant assigning points 
as were described in the solicitation. Similarly, in most 
of the cases where qualitative, relative weighting was in 
the solicitation, evaluations used those qualitative rank-
ing in the evaluation. 
However, in 12 cases, the Forest Service created a 
numerical point or grading system for evaluating bids 
that were used internally but had not been provided to 
prospective bidders. By and large, these reflected the 
qualitative descriptions provided in the solicitations. 
of the 12 awards, six were rFQs and six were rFPs. 
The approaches varied with some using grading sys-
tems such as excellent/good/poor while others assigned 
points or percentage values.
The Forest Service did not provide documentation 
of their evaluation process in three cases.
Conducting evaluations
The amount of detail provided about evaluation pro-
cesses varied considerably from case to case. given this 
variety, we can describe the range of approaches used, 
but we cannot provide definitive answers about the rela-
tive frequency of approaches.
Three main configurations of staff conducted the 
evaluations. In 41% of cases, a team of Forest Service 
non-contracting staff evaluated offers. In 15% of cases, 
a single non-contracting staff person evaluated offers. In 
12% of cases, the contracting officer appeared to evalu-
ate offers without assistance from other agency staff. In 
                Forest Service Use of Best Value Contracting                         
these instances, there was no documentation of conver-
sations with other staff, although we could not typically 
rule out staff input. In another 9% of cases, the contract-
ing officer conducted the evaluation with input from 
other staff. 
The documentation of evaluation processes varied 
considerably from case to case.  In some cases, evalua-
tion team members filled out worksheets in which they 
rated the non-price factors and wrote comments. The 
team then discussed their evaluations as a group with-
out reference to price. after completing the review of the 
non-price factors, they reviewed the price offers, con-
sidered trade-offs between price and other factors, and 
made a recommendation to the contracting officer. These 
recommendations often included a written justification 
of why the preferred contractor. 
In some cases, the Forest Service eliminated the 
high priced offers and evaluated the remaining offers us-
ing the process described above, if any. 
When the evaluation was qualitative or there was 
no team evaluation, the types of notes included in the 
file varied considerably. At one end of the spectrum, 
narrative evaluations sometimes provided comments 
about reference checks, discussion of the skills and past 
performance of bidders, and discussions about why one 
contractor may be more appropriate than another in a 
particular case. at the other end of the spectrum, some 
evaluations were completely undocumented or docu-
mented with a file note saying that an evaluation had 
occurred and which offer had been accepted but little 
to indicate why, except in several instances, to indicate 
that they were the low-price offer. 
In general, then, we saw a variety of evaluation 
processes ranging from ones in which there was detailed 
consideration of multiple non-price factors by a number 
of staff to a briefer consideration of price in relation to 
other factors, primarily by the contracting officer and 
perhaps one other non-contracting staff person. We also 
saw a considerable number of file notes that indicated 
that the lowest price offer was justified.
Offers and Awards
With greater knowledge about the evaluation pro-
cess, we can turn to the question of how that process 
might be affecting who wins contracts.
of the 34 contracts in our sample, the Forest Service 
awarded 25 (74%) to the contractor offering the low-
est price. The Forest Service awarded 78% percent of 
tree thinning contracts to the contractor with the lowest 
price bid, whereas 63% of construction contracts were 
awarded to the lowest bidder, which is suggestive of dif-
ferent market patterns. given the sample size, however, 
we cannot say definitively whether this represents a 
larger trend. 
Five of the nine (56%) contracts awarded to some-
one other than the lowest bidder were rFPs. Thirty-two 
percent of the whole sample were RFPs. In five of the 
nine cases, the award amount was below the govern-
ment estimate, which was just less than the rate at 
which the sample as a whole. But, this was not enough 
of a difference to suggest a pattern (more about the gov-
ernment estimate below).
By itself, it is difficult to interpret whether awarding 
74% of contracts to the lowest bidder is a high or low 
number. In part, it depends on ones perspective about 
what the priorities should be when awarding contracts. 
We can, however, shed additional light on the question 
by comparing the evaluation criteria and process used 
to select contractors to the winning offers. It may be that 
the lowest price offers are also best technical proposals, 
which would support the notion of a high percentage of 
awards to the lowest bidder. on the other hand, it may 
be that low price is valued over other factors, either in 
the criteria or in the evaluation process.  
as discussed above, the Forest Service awarded 
74% of contracts in our sample to the lowest bidder. of 
the 21% (nine contracts) awarded to someone other than 
the lowest bidder, one was awarded to the second lowest 
bidder even though price was the only factor considered 
because the lowest bidder could not meet the schedule. 
In eight remaining cases, price was equal in weight 
to all other factors combined. In seven of the eight cases, 
the Forest Service convened a review team to evaluate 
all offers. The review team ranked each technical pro-
posal. They were then given the price offers to consider 
a trade off against technical scores. Typically, the Forest 
Service documented and justified reasons for accept-
ing an offer other than the lowest price. In the remain-
ing case, the highest price offers appeared to have been 
eliminated prior to evaluation. It was unclear if a team 
or individual conducted the evaluation. 
The frequency of thorough, multi-person evalua-
tions among the contracts awarded to someone other 
than the lowest bidder, along with the absence of limited 
reviews, suggests that team reviews might be a necessary 
component of a process that makes awards to someone 
other then the lowest bidder a real possibility.
of the 34 contracts in our sample, the Forest Ser-
vice awarded 32% of contracts to the highest ranked 
non-price proposal and 26% to a contractor that did not 
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rank highest technically. Eighteen percent (6 of 34) of 
winning bidders offered the lowest price and the highest 
ranked non-price proposal. In 15% of cases, the evalu-
ation process did appear to focus on identifying the 
lowest cost acceptable bid. In these cases, the evaluation 
seemed to work from the lowest price upwards until 
a technically acceptable bid was identified. In another 
26% of cases, we could not determine the technical 
ranking of the winning bidder or no evaluation was 
conducted.
In reviewing the notes and correspondence associat-
ed with proposal evaluation, we noticed that the Forest 
Service seemed more concerned with clearly justifying 
an award that rejected the lowest price offer than with 
justifying an award that rejected the highest scoring 
technical proposal. In addition, as noted above, we saw 
a greater rate of rejection of the highest ranked techni-
cal proposals than rejection of the lowest bidders. These 
patterns, combined with the ranking of price equal to 
all other factors combined, and the number of instances 
in which the Forest Service appeared to seek for the 
lowest priced acceptable proposal, suggest a system in 
which price is a very important factor.  Clearly, it is not 
the only important factor in all cases as evidenced by 
the considerable number of thorough evaluations and 
the smaller number of awards to someone other than the 
lowest bidder.
Government Estimates
Relationship to Winning Offer
If the government estimate reflects the market for 
providing the requested services, we would expect that 
the winning bids would center on the government es-
timate. That is, the number of awards above and below 
the government estimate would be similar and the distri-
bution would look like a bell curve.  
We examined the relationship between the govern-
ment estimate and award prices. The pattern was not 
quite a bell curve although there were awards both that 
were above and below the government estimate (Figure 
1). awards below the government estimate were some-
what more likely than awards above the government 
estimate. of the 33 contracts in our sample for which we 
had a government estimate, the Forest Service awarded 
21 (63%) below the government estimate, includ-
ing eight (24%) awarded at more than 20% below the 
government estimate. The agency awarded 8 contracts 
(24%) at prices above the government estimate, includ-
ing four awarded more than 20% above the government 
estimate.
We found similar patterns when we compared the 
tree thinning contracts to other contracts in the sample 
including construction or surveys. although our sample 
size is small and it is difficult to draw definitive con-
clusions, it does suggest that problems with working 
conditions in the labor-intensive markets such as tree 
thinning may be not readily measured by comparing the 
government estimate and the award amounts.
There are, however, two possible challenges to this 
conclusion. First, in new mexico, not all tree-thinning 
contracts are labor-intensive, and thus might not be part 
of the problematic contracting market. Second, before 
drawing this conclusion we would need to understand 
whether the government estimates reflect the costs of 
following all labor laws rather than simply the market. 
If the government estimates are a reflection of a market 
that has incorporated labor-law violations and other 
cost-savings strategies into it, government estimates 
based on historical market prices are likely to underes-
timate true costs. Thus, it is important to consider how 
the government estimates are calculated before drawing 
firm conclusions. 
Before turning to the question of how government 
estimates are calculated, it is worth considering some 
possible explanations for why awards appear more like-
ly to be below the government estimate. one possibility 
is that a government estimate may, at times, represent 
the most money available to complete a project. We saw 
correspondence to that effect in a couple of files. When 
this is the case, we would expect the Forest Service 
either to award the project below the government esti-
mate or to not award the contract. This scenario would 
increase the likelihood of having awards below the 
government estimate. a second possibility would be an 
emphasis on purchasing services at the lowest possibly 
price. We saw some evidence of the evaluation processes 
for some contracts. a third possibility would be inac-
curate estimates. We can shed light on this possibility by 
examining the ways in which the Forest Service calcu-
lates the government estimate in practice.
Calculating the Government Estimate
The government estimate calculations were docu-
mented in a number of different ways. For 13 contracts 
in our sample, the Forest Service used a template to 
calculate the government estimate. These templates 
typically included project-specific costs such as pro-
duction rates, typical crew sizes, mileage to and from 
work site, and project size. In addition, the template 
included a number of fixed assumptions such as the 
Service Contract act wage rates, workers compensation 
rates, mileage rates, payroll tax rates, and the like. These 
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templates often included modest indirect costs and 
profits rates. For another group of 11 contracts, the gov-
ernment estimate was based on historical costs without 
any documented calculations. In another 10 cases, there 
was apparently no documentation in the file about how 
government estimates were calculated.
given that nearly two-thirds of estimates are either 
undocumented or based on historical market prices 
without current cost calculations, it is difficult to know 
the extent to which government estimates reflect the 
costs of paying full Service Contract act wages, workers 
compensation, and the like. This is of particular concern 
in parts of the market where there may be difficulty with 
labor law compliance.
If the market has supported the full costs of pay-
ing Service Contract act wages, workers compensation 
costs, and other costs of completing the activities then 
inflation-adjusted market-based or historical estimates 
would likely reflect the costs of strictly following all 
labor and contracting laws. But, if the historical market 
prices have included underpayment of wages, workers 
compensation or other costs, then market-based govern-
ment estimates are too low to account for the full costs 
of completing the work legally.  If this were the case, it 
may make sense for the Forest Service to calculate esti-
mates from scratch rather than relying on historical mar-
ket-based estimates. This may be particularly true for 











below -20% .-20 to -11% .-10 to -6 % .-5% to -1% 0 1 to 5% 6 to 10 % 11 to 20 % above 20%















Figure 1 - Relationship of Award Amount to the Government Estimate
activities that involve a seasonal, guest worker, or im-
migrant workforce such as tree thinning, tree planting, 
and other reforestation activities. again, given the data 
available we cannot say which of these scenarios are in 
play, only that the Forest Service is more frequently than 
not relying on market-based estimate of prices. given 
this reliance on market-based estimates, the relationship 
of government estimate to award amount is probably not 
a good indicator of the extent of “below cost” awards.
Conclusion
This project sought to understand how the Forest 
Service evaluates contract offers and how that af-
fects who is awarded contracts. In addition, it sought 
to understand how the Forest Service calculates the 
government estimate and how it compares to award 
prices. given the limited geographic scope and the small 
number of contracts included in the study, broad gener-
alizations are probably not appropriate. That said, there 
are several patterns worth highlighting. 
Best value contracting is one of several types of 
mechanisms that the Forest Service uses to awards 
contracts. The national forests in this sample appeared 
to use best value about two-thirds of the time. They also 
solicited offers from a sole source under a variety of 
circumstances including, for example, when expedit-
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ing awards for post-fire rehabilitation or when contracts 
were set aside for 8(a) contractors.
For best value contracts, the Forest Service uses a 
wide variety of evaluation criteria including price, past 
performance, technical skills and experience, and per-
sonnel. none of the contracts in our sample used local 
community benefit as an evaluation factor. 
although the non-price criteria varied considerably 
from contract to contract, price was typically equal to 
all other factors combined. With this sort of weighting, 
price and non-price factors can be thought about in at 
least two ways. First, one might think about price first 
and only seriously consider non-price factors when of-
fers were very close in price. Second, one might focus 
first on non-price factors and then consider price differ-
ences in relation to quality of technical proposals. We 
saw both of these approaches in the sample.
The national forests in the study evaluated offers in 
a number of different ways. at one end of the spectrum, 
teams evaluated non-price offers in considerable detail 
and only later focused on price. at the other end of the 
spectrum, the focus seemed to be on price, with limited 
attention to non-price factors, except to ensure that they 
met minimum standards.
national forests awarded contracts both above and 
below the government estimate. However, the national 
forests in this study appear somewhat more likely to 
award contracts below the government estimate than 
above. awards well below or well above (more than 
20%) the government estimate were relatively rare. at 
the same time, however, most government estimates 
appeared to be based on historical market prices rather 
than on cost-based calculations. In this context, it is 
difficult to use the government estimate to evaluate the 
extent to which the market reflects the full cost of fol-
lowing all labor, insurance, safety, and contract laws be-
cause the government estimate often reflects the market 
prices as opposed to these cost estimates.
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